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By Nirmalya Kumar, Sheetal Mittal & Stephen Eryung Chu
An undisputed leader?
Starbucks’ sudden downturn in  
China was attributed to the threat 
posed by a local start-up to its  
‘third place’ positioning.
In 2018, Starbucks was the undisputed leader among 
China’s coffeehouse chains, with more than 70 percent in market 
share and 3,600 cafés. The brand’s success was rooted in its core 
proposition of providing consumers a ‘third place’ (also called 
di san kong jian in Mandarin)—an escape from both home and 
the workplace—to relax and indulge themselves. Starbucks had 
entered China in 1999, and the country (and Asia Pacific overall) 
was the company’s fastest growing market. It was hence quite 
surprising when the company faced a setback in the region in 
2018, witnessing a decline in its third quarter sales, total number 
of transactions for the year, and annual operating income.
Starbucks’ sudden downturn in the region was attributed 
to the threat posed by Luckin Coffee to its ‘third place’ 
positioning. Launched in China in November 2017, Luckin 
grew to more than 2,300 stores in just 17 months. Unlike 
Starbucks, it offered lower prices and the convenience of 
having coffee anywhere—at home, the workplace or a café. 
According to the company, its mobile app-linked order and 
cashless payment platform, along with a store pick-up and 
delivery model, appealed to the country’s digitally savvy 
millennials. Over 2018-2019, the company successfully 
raised US$550 million, and in May 2019, launched its initial 
public offering. By the end of 2019, Luckin aimed to open 
a total of 4,850 stores in China to surpass Starbucks’ 
planned network of 4,200 stores.
The sudden rise of Luckin raises important questions 
for Starbucks. What does it need to do in order to maintain 
its dominance in China? Should it emulate Luckin and work 
towards building a stronger and wider delivery channel, or 
should it continue to pursue its premium priced experiential 
retail strategy? 
‘Third place’ positioning:  
Home, work and Starbucks 
By the end of 2018, Starbucks, which was founded in 1971 
in the U.S., was by far the largest coffeehouse chain in the 
world with total revenue of US$24.7 billion, 29,324 stores 
across 78 countries, and a global headcount of over 
291,000 employees worldwide.1 In fact, Starbucks had more 
than 11 times the revenue and seven times the number of 
outlets of its closest competitor, Costa Coffee.
From the outset, Starbucks provided consumers a 
differentiated and unique experience of coffee consumption, 
which it called the ‘Starbucks Experience’. Its outlets were 
developed around the concept of a ‘third place’, where people 
could pamper themselves, socialise and enjoy spending 
time there. This not only clicked well with customers who 
did not mind paying more for their coffee to enjoy the 
experience, but also earned Starbucks a distinct identity 
in the increasingly competitive café industry. Another factor 
that contributed to Starbucks’ impressive growth trajectory 
was its adherence to rigorous standards of quality and a 
suitably adapted food menu that catered to local tastes. 
Over 2000-2008, Starbucks’ outlets across the globe grew 
more than threefold, from 5,000 to 16,680. However, in this 
quest for expansion, inadvertently, there was a greater 
thrust on ‘takeaway’ than the company’s original value 
proposition of consumers sitting in the café and enjoying 
their coffee.2 Consequently, Starbucks’ sales growth over 
this period declined, and there was a drop of 42 percent 
in its stock value.3 
Rebuilding the StaRbuckS expeRience
Rebuilding the ‘third place’ equity helped turn around the 
company. In 2008, besides closing down 600 stores (many 
of which had been opened in the previous three years), 
Starbucks trained its baristas to improve their art of brewing 
coffee, bought more advanced coffee equipment, and 
reorganised its supply chain for better inventory management 
at the cafés. Starbucks also integrated technology to provide 
consumers a seamless digital experience, improved its social 
media presence, and introduced customer rewards cards. 
In order to ‘recapture the coffeehouse feel’, it redesigned 
its stores in terms of colour scheme, architecture, lighting, 
and furniture.4 
Starbucks 
in China
CASe in poinT
Starbucks’ Western upscale  
sensibility presented an aspirational 
but affordable luxury to a growing  
middle class looking to indulge itself.
AnnuAl Coffee ConSumpTion per CApiTA (2018)
its stores were adorned with locally-crafted wine urns and 
wooden carvings to reflect Chinese heritage. In 2018, 
Starbucks established its first Asian R&D centre in China 
to develop a more locally-inspired coffee menu.11 
going digital
Starbucks also undertook a number of steps to cater to 
China’s highly digitised customers and an increasingly cashless 
society. Through its mobile app, the company allowed ‘My 
Starbucks Rewards’ members to manage their card balance, 
and also made it easier for them to earn and redeem rewards, 
and find a nearby Starbucks store with the store locator 
feature. In early 2016, it launched a mobile payment feature 
on its app, enabling its members to e-pay for their purchases 
at stores nationwide.12 The coffeehouse chain also partnered 
with WeChat Pay in December 2016, and followed up with 
a tie-up with Alipay in 2017—the two portals together 
held a 90 percent share of China’s mobile payments market.13 
By 2018, almost 80 percent of Starbucks transactions in 
China were cash-free.14 
Given the high penetration level of digital communication 
in China, the coffee chain promoted itself using local social 
media platforms. In 2017, it launched its campaign, ‘Say it with 
Starbucks’, which enabled about 826 million WeChat users 
to buy a beverage or a gift card through the app.15 
luckin Coffee: The home-grown  
caffeinated foe 
While the coffeehouse culture in China had come a long 
way since the entry of Starbucks, it was in the throes of 
yet another transformation with the emergence of ‘new 
retail’, a term referring to the seamless integration of 
offline and online retail. In China’s coffee industry, new 
retail was primarily led by three key factors—a rapidly 
growing coffee-drinking population, a high level of mobile 
and digital penetration, and most importantly, an 
increasing demand for delivery by convenience-oriented 
urban customers living in congested cities. With a rise in 
the number of customers demanding their coffee to be 
delivered within minutes of ordering (either online or 
offline), coffeehouse chains, both domestic and international, 
were scrambling to meet this demand by providing a blend 
of e-commerce, mobile shopping and brick-and-mortar 
storefronts.
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In 2014, Starbucks changed its no-advertising policy and 
launched its first ever global brand campaign, ‘Meet me at 
Starbucks’. The campaign, shot in 59 stores located across 
28 countries, strongly emphasised the relationships customers 
cultivated when meeting at Starbucks. In 2016, 2017 and 
2018, the coffeehouse chain spent US$248.6 million, 
US$282.6 million and US$260.3 million respectively, on 
advertising.
upScaling the expeRience: pRemium StoReS
In 2018, Starbucks launched its ultra-premium roastery and 
reserve project.5 Reserve roasteries were essentially coffee 
emporiums (part café and part production facilities), and the 
reserve stores were a café-only version. While a traditional 
Starbucks store averaged 1,800 square feet in floor space, 
the reserve roasteries were 10 to 15 times larger. It provided 
an immersive retail experience including Italian artisanal 
high-end food by Princi bakery, lounge areas with fireplaces, 
and a full liquor bar, in addition to a traditional coffee bar 
showcasing its innovative specialty—its premium brand, small-lot 
Starbucks reserve coffee.
By the end of the year, Starbucks had opened four reserve 
roasteries in Seattle, Milan, Shanghai and New York,6 and it 
planned to open another 30 reserve roastery emporiums and 
1,000 reserve stores over the next few years, with the primary 
objective of amplifying the brand-customer experience. 
Starbucks: Caffeinating China 
In 2018, China’s annual coffee consumption per capita was 
only 6.2 cups against 209 in Taiwan, 250 in the U.K. and 
Hong Kong, 279 in Japan, 388 in the U.S., and 867 in Germany. 
However, the annual average coffee consumption in the country, 
a largely tea-drinking nation, had grown at 15-20 percent over 
the last decade compared to the global average of only 2 percent.
China’s increasingly affluent consumer class had greater 
awareness of Western trends, and associated coffee with a 
modern lifestyle and status. Of the three consumer coffee 
categories—instant coffee (72 percent in market share), 
ready-to-drink coffee (10 percent) and fresh ground coffee 
(18 percent), the demand for fresh ground coffee, despite 
being the most expensive, was increasing with the rising trend 
of on-premises consumption in the country.
The coffee culture in China had, to a large extent, been 
ushered in by the entry of Starbucks in 1999. By 2018, the 
coffeehouse chain had expanded rapidly across more than 
150 cities, opening on average, one new store every 15 
hours between 2013 and 2018. By 2016, Starbucks was the 
undisputed leader with a market share of 74.6 percent, far 
ahead of its closest competitors McCafé at 9.1 percent, 
Costa Coffee at 8.4 percent and Pacific Coffee at 3.9 percent.7 
In Shanghai alone, Starbucks had about 600 stores, the 
largest number of outlets in any single city in the world. 
a pRemieR Di San Kong Jian 
Starbucks’ ‘third place’ positioning struck a chord with the 
consumers struggling to cope with increasingly crowded 
living and work spaces, and congested traffic conditions in 
Chinese cities. The coffeehouse chain was an attractive 
alternative for people to get together conveniently and 
comfortably. Its Western upscale sensibility presented 
an aspirational but affordable luxury to a growing middle 
class looking to indulge itself. 
In 2011, the company’s loyalty programme, ‘My Starbucks 
Rewards’, was introduced in China, and more than seven million 
members had signed up by 2018.8 To make the brand a little 
more exclusive, consumers in China were required to pay 
to join the programme, unlike in the U.S. where it was free. 
In 2014, the coffeehouse chain also introduced a stored 
value card to provide customers with a potential gift item 
besides a convenient payment method. 
To position itself as a premium coffee brand, Starbucks 
priced its coffee higher than that of the local players in China, 
and selected high-end locations for its stores such as luxury 
malls and iconic office buildings. Additionally, since Chinese 
society associated foreign brands with a higher status, the 
coffeehouse chain often labelled its imported products 
with the country from which they had been sourced.9 It 
introduced most of its global brands in China, and offered 
menu choices similar to what it served in the U.S., while 
introducing differences such as red bean flavoured scones 
to appeal to the local palate. 
The introduction of 30 Starbucks reserve stores in the 
country and the world’s largest Starbucks reserve roastery 
in Shanghai in 2017 further aimed to build on its upscale image 
and encourage consumers to linger over their expensive brews.
acceSSible and localiSed
Targeting white-collar office workers, Starbucks located the 
majority of its retail stores in the central business district 
of Chinese cities. To encourage the congregation of formal 
and informal groups of co-workers, friends or family, it designed 
its stores in China to be up to 40 percent bigger than those 
in the U.S., with an open-style sitting area that had no interior 
walls and spilled out onto walkways and lobbies.10 Many of 
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Chinese cities with the Alibaba-owned 
Ele.me, a leading online food delivery 
site, and aimed to offer the service in 
about 90 percent of its stores in China 
within a year.26 Additionally, Starbucks 
opened its first two delivery kitchens, 
Besides the expense of about US$1.04 
per order (charged to Starbucks by 
delivery companies), each Starbucks 
delivery order required a special 
double-layered lid to keep the drink 
hot or cold, spill-proof packaging, and 
a tamper-proof packaging seal. It also 
required unique containers that ensured 
optimal temperature and standards for 
beverage and food quality, and safety 
during delivery.27 
Meanwhile, Luckin was shoring up 
its capital. In 2018, the company raised 
a total of US$400 million over two 
rounds of financing. Centurium Capital, a 
private equity fund, and GIC, Singapore’s 
sovereign wealth fund, invested the 
first round of US$200 million. This 
catapulted Luckin to a US$1 billion 
valuation in July 2018, within eight 
months of its operations. Six months 
later, in December 2018, the second 
round of US$200 million funding 
by GIC, China International Capital 
Corporation (an investment banking 
firm) and Joy Capital took Luckin’s 
known as ‘Star Kitchens’, inside 
Hema supermarkets in Hangzhou and 
Shanghai, leveraging the supermarket’s 
logistical capabilities for delivery. 
However, there were high costs 
associated with the delivery channel. 
Some of the competitors are 
competing through heavy,  
heavy discounts that we don’t 
believe are sustainable. 
- Kevin Johnson, 
CEO, Starbucks25 
In response to the success of coffeehouse chains in China, particularly 
Starbucks, Jenny Qian Zhiya founded Luckin in November 2017. Qian had 
recognised that the demand for fresh ground coffee in China was growing 
exponentially, and that coffee had transitioned from being a social lubricator to a 
lifestyle habit. However, the market was underpenetrated due to high prices and 
inconvenience in accessing the product. She thus targeted the untapped demand 
by offering coffee at prices that were about 30 percent lower than the high-end 
brands like Starbucks and Costa, but higher than McDonald’s and Family Mart, 
the low-end players associated with lower quality. In addition, Luckin offered 
a technology-driven retail model comprising online and offline integration that 
enabled customers to order and pick up from their nearest store, get it delivered, 
or enjoy it at a café.16 The twin elements of the start-up’s new retail model— 
low prices and super-speedy delivery—were enabled through its mobile app and 
wide store network. 
The mobile app covered the entire customer purchase process including menu, 
order, payment and delivery options. Irrespective of the type of order (pick-up, 
delivery or on-premises), all orders and payments could only be made through the 
app, resulting in fully cashless transactions. This mobile app-based model appealed 
to the digitally savvy Chinese consumers, especially the millennials, who preferred 
using online menus and paying through their smartphones. Other than Luckin’s 
own ‘coffee wallet’, payment could also be made through third-party payment service 
providers such as Weixin Pay, Union Pay and the ubiquitous WeChat platform. 
Luckin focused on building an expansive store network comprising three 
formats: pick-up stores (87 percent) consisting of small shopfronts with no or 
limited seating that largely catered to mobile order pick-ups and delivery, delivery 
kitchens (8 percent) comprising dedicated kitchens that focused solely on processing 
and dispatching orders, and relax stores (5 percent) which were café-style stores 
where customers could sit and enjoy their coffee.17 
Most of Luckin’s stores were located in office buildings, commercial areas and 
university campuses, and were designed for fast pick-up and delivery.18 The company 
claimed to have achieved 100 percent coverage within a 500 metre radius of central 
districts in big cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, with access to at least one store 
within a five-minute walk in these areas.19 
Besides using many of its outlets as kitchens to quickly fulfil the orders placed, 
Luckin relied heavily on technology for smart ordering and dispatch of deliveries, 
in collaboration with SF Express, a Chinese courier company.20 Consequently, it 
claimed that its average delivery time was only about 18 minutes and the coffee was 
given free if it did not reach its destination within 30 minutes. The tech-based start-up 
used big data analytics and artificial intelligence to study customer behaviour and 
transactions in real time to better craft its products and services strategy, implement 
dynamic pricing, and improve customer retention.21 In addition, Luckin reported 
that its centralised system helped improve the company’s operational efficiency 
through standardisation, enabling it to rapidly scale up its presence. 
By March 2019, Luckin declared that it had sold more than 90 million cups 
of coffee across 28 cities and employed a 16,645-strong workforce in the country.22 
According to the analysts at Inside Retail Asia, it had taken Starbucks nearly 
13 years to achieve the size that Luckin claimed to have reached in just one year.23
pRicing, diScountS and 
adveRtiSing StRategy 
Luckin’s dynamic pricing was based 
on a low fixed price and flexible 
discounting strategy. While its latte 
was priced at about US$3.54 (including 
a US$0.87 delivery charge) compared to 
US$4.28 from Starbucks, its aggressive 
and regular discounts such as free first 
drink, free drink for recommending 
the app, free drink for following it on 
social media, two-for-three, five-for-ten 
and free delivery above a certain order 
size, brought its effective selling price 
down to be the lowest in the market 
(refer to Figure 1). 
In 2018, Luckin reported that it 
had spent US$111 million or 87 percent 
of its annual net revenue on advertising 
and marketing. It signed top-tier 
celebrities in China, Zhang Zhen and 
Tang Wei, as its brand ambassadors, 
and also partnered with foreign baristas 
such as Andrea Lattuada, former judge 
of the World Barista Championships, 
to help build brand credibility.24 
According to the company, its app-
only model enabled it to have a digital 
profile of and a digital connection with 
each of its customers, hence it could 
implement highly-focused online 
marketing initiatives. 
David versus Goliath
In view of the rise of Luckin, Starbucks 
partnered with China’s largest e-commerce 
conglomerate, Alibaba, in August 2018, 
to provide ‘Starbucks Delivers’, a service 
to deliver its beverages within 30 minutes. 
It linked its 2,000 outlets across 30 
By 2018, almost  
80 percent of Starbucks 
transactions in China 
were cash-free.
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going forward, Starbucks would have 
to decide on the relative emphasis it 
should place on emulating the local 
competition, and work towards building 
a stronger and wider delivery channel 
versus continuing to pursue its premium 
priced experiential retail strategy.
This case was developed with the support of Singapore 
Management University's Retail Centre of Excellence (RCoE). 
The complete case, published in October 2019, can be accessed 
at https://cmp.smu.edu.sg/case/4166
valuation to US$2.2 billion.28 Buoyed 
by its market standing, the company 
raised another US$150 million in April 
2019, before its initial public offering 
in May 2019.29
It was clear that the value propositions 
the two companies offered were quite 
distinctive from each other. While 
Starbucks strived to satisfy the 
consumers’ needs of self-indulgence and 
social gratification, Luckin catered to 
the functional needs of the mass 
market through easy, quick and 
affordable access. Going forward, 
Starbucks would have to decide on the 
relative emphasis it should place on 
emulating Luckin, and work towards 
building a stronger and wider delivery 
channel versus continuing to pursue 
its premium priced experiential retail 
strategy. Moreover, although Luckin’s 
success had negatively impacted 
Starbucks’ growth in the short term, 
it seemed implausible that its cash-burn 
business model that includes heavy 
discounting, aggressive advertising and 
rapid store expansion could continue 
without raising an alarm eventually. 
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